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ABSTRACT 
 
TWO ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMICS 
Doğan, Burak 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. Dr. Hakan Berument 
August 2003 
 The empirical evidence suggests that openness decreases the effect of monetary 
policy on output; however the effect on prices is not statistically significant. In the first 
chapter of this research these predictions are tested over the open economy of Turkey for 
quarterly data from 1987:1 to 2001:1. This chapter assesses how the openness affects the 
effectiveness of monetary policy on output and prices.   
 The purpose of the second chapter is to assess if expansionary and 
contractionary government spending shocks have an asymmetric effect for Turkish 
economy. There might be asymmetry for the effect of fiscal policy on economic 
outcome due to stickiness of prices, perception of changes (permanent versus 
transitory) and nearness to full employment. This chapter assesses this asymmetry for 
Turkey by using quarterly data from 1987:I to 2001:I. The empirical evidence reported 
here reveals that private consumption and investment decrease in the face of 
expansionary government spending shocks; however, they either do not change or 
decrease very little under contractionary government spending shocks. 
 
Keywords: Openness, Monetary Policy, Asymmetric Effect, Fiscal Policy 
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ÖZET 
 
MAKROEKONOMİ KONUNLU İKİ MAKALE 
Doğan, Burak 
Master, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hakan Berument 
Ağustos 2003 
 Ampirik bulgular, dışa açıklığın, para politikasının üretim üzerindeki etkisini 
azalttığını, ancak fiyatlar üzerindeki etkisinin ise istatiksel olarak anlamlı olmadığını 
göstermektedir. Bu araştırmanın ilk kısmında, bu öngörüler, 1987:1 - 2001:1 dönemini 
kapsayan üç aylık veriler kullanılarak Türkiye için test edilmektedir. Bu kısım, dışa açıklığın, 
para politikasının üretim ve fiyatlar üzerindeki etkisini nasıl etkilediği değerlendirilmektedir. 
 İkinci kısmın amacı, genişletici ve daraltıcı kamu harcamalarının, Türk 
ekonomisi üzerinde asimetrik etkilere sahip olup olmadığı değerlendirilmektedir. 
Fiyat yapışkanlığı, değişiklikleri algılama (kalıcı veya geçici) ve tam istihdama 
yakınlığa bağlı olarak, maliye politikasının etkileri asimetrik olabilir. Bu kısımda, söz 
konusu asimetri, 1987:1 – 2001:1 dönemini kapsayan üç aylık veriler kullanılarak 
Türkiye örneği için değerlendirilmektedir. Elde edilen ampirik sonuçlara göre, 
genişletici kamu harcamaları şokuna tepki olarak özel tüketim ve yatırım 
azalmaktadır; ancak, bu değişkenler, daraltıcı kamu harcamalarına tepki olarak ya 
değişmemekte, ya da çok az oranda azalmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Dışa Açıklık, Para Politikası, Asimetrik Etki, Maliye Politikası  
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CHAPTER 1: Openness and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: 
Empirical Evidence from Turkey  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In his paper Romer (1993) investigates the relationship between openness and 
inflation. He argues that the absence of precommitment in monetary policy leads to 
inefficiently high inflation. He claims that the less open economy would have a 
greater incentive to expand and so have a higher equilibrium of inflation rate. This 
relation can be explained as unanticipated monetary expansion causes real exchange 
rate depreciation and since more open economies are more available to be effected by 
the harms of real depreciation the benefits of unanticipated expansion are negatively 
correlated with the degree of openness. Therefore if the money authority considers 
openness as an important state variable for the monetary policy, monetary authorities 
in more open economies will on average expand money supply less and will have 
lower average rates of inflation. Dennis (2001) argues also that the well-known result 
of depreciation of domestic exchange rate is increasing inflation. But as Romer does, 
Dennis concludes that the money authority intervenes or does not let to absence of 
precommitment in monetary policy. So expansion is less and so inflation is lower in 
small open economies.                   
There is another sight of view, which says that in a more open economy, increase 
of money supply is expected to be more inflationary while the change in the output 
level would be rather smaller than it is expected or negative. Because the ability of 
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money to affect output is supposed to be weaker in more open economies, whereas 
the inflationary effects of changes in money supply increase with openness due to 
substitution effect. This differentiation is because of the different responses of the 
aggregate supplies of the both different countries by the mean of their openness 
levels. In an open economy the fluctuations of the exchange rates will create an 
expectation of depreciation of the currency. This expectation will trigger the wage 
demand so monetary expansion will be reflected on prices and less on output. Bryant, 
Henderson, Holtham and Symansky  (1988), in their empirical study by more than 10 
macroeconometric models, predicts that monetary expansion raise output and the 
price level while the contractions have the opposite effects. Papadopoulos (1993) 
investigates the effects of monetary policy on output and prices for an open economy 
in the case of Greece for the period of 1955-90. In his paper, he finds that 
contractionary government policy financed by domestic credit accelerated the 
recession with inflation declining after a two years lag. Atesoglu and Dutkowsky 
(1995) in their empirical study on money, output and prices in Turkey, mention that 
monetary expansion should not be involved with attempts to stimulate output.  Karras 
(1999) confirms the same theory.  In his paper Karras shows the expected theoretical 
effects of monetary policy empirically using a panel of 38 countries from the 1953-
1990 periods. Karras argues that the effectiveness of the monetary policies is related 
to the openness of the economy such that the effect of expansionary monetary policy 
decreases output but increases the inflation rate. Guncavdi and Kucukcifci (2001) in 
their paper which is about foreign trade and factor intensity also conclude that, the 
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importation of intermediate goods created an employment generation and capital 
savings effects in 1990 in Turkey. They explain this fact by the general expectations 
of neoclassical theory of comparative advantage, which postulates that foreign trade 
induces the use of relatively abundant domestic resources as causing savings in scarce 
ones, such as capital.  
We can sum up the expectations as follows; an unanticipated permanent monetary 
expansion raises aggregate demand. This is because of two reasons. First monetary 
expansion reduces the domestic interest rate and increases the aggregate demand. 
Second monetary expansion creates depreciation on domestic currency. As a result of 
depreciation on domestic currency, prices of domestic goods rise. In the short run 
output increases but in the long run following the adjustments of the monetary 
authority over the economy output declines backward.  
This paper assess that with the increasing degree of the openness, effectiveness of 
the monetary policy decreases on output and prices for more open economy in the 
case of Turkey. Quarterly data from 1987:1 up to 2001:1 period for Turkey is used to 
estimate the relationship between openness and the effects of monetary policy on 
output and prices. Our estimated methods support the theoretical expectations: change 
in the money supply will lead to smaller output. Also as a parallel result of Romer’s 
we found out that, expansionary monetary policy has an impact on inflation, which 
demonstrates a negative relationship with the level of openness. 
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The remainder of the paper consists of three sections. In section 2, we set up the 
specification used in this paper. Section 3 is the empirical results of the estimation 
and finally section 4 offers concluding remarks.   
 
1.2 Equations that are used to estimate 
In order to estimate the effect of openness on money-output relationship we 
estimate the following equation; 
∆yt= ß0 + Σ3i=1ß1 Di + ß2 D94t + Σ
4
i=1ß3i  ∆yt-i +  Σ
4
i=0 ß4i  ∆mt-i +                    (1) 
         Σ4i=0 ß5i  (opent-1∆mt-i) + u
y
t  
Here; ∆yt is the output growth rate, ∆mt is the money growth rate, opent is the measure 
of openness at time t, ßs are the coefficients, u
y
t is the output residual at time t. In 
order to assess the effect of the openness on money-price relationship we estimate the 
following equation; 
∆pt= α0 + Σ3i=1 α 1 Di + α 2 D94t + Σ
4
i=1 α 3i  ∆pt-i +  Σ
4
i= 0 α 4i  ∆mt-i +                  (2) 
        Σ4i=0 α 5i  (opent-1∆mt-i) + u
p
t   
Here; ∆pt is the inflation rate, ∆mt is the money growth rate, opent is the measure of 
openness at time t, αs are the coefficients, upt  is the output residual at time t.       
Dummy variables with coefficient ß1 and α 1 are used for the monthly effects for 
the quarterly data. Dummy variable D94 is used for the self-inflicted 1994 crisis at 
the second quarter.                           
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The data for all the variables are gathered from the Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey electronic data delivery system1. Real GDP growth rate is used for ∆yt, 
which is constant with 1987 prices. Logarithmic first difference of GDP deflator is 
used for inflation. Openness is quantified with two different fractions as being 
seasonally adjusted. One of the definitions of openness is the ratio of sum of the 
import and export with GDP both with 1987 prices [(IM+EX)/GDP]. The other 
definition is the ratio of import and GDP [IM/GDP]. In order to avoid simultaneity 
biased problem lag value of these ratios are entered into the specification. Three 
money aggregates; M1, M2, M2Y2; are used as the money indicators for ∆m.  
 
1.3 Empirical results                 
Table 1 reports the estimate of output equation (equation 1) and Table2 reports 
the estimate of price equation (equation 2) for three money measures (M1, M2, 
M2Y).  Tables are formed in two parts as “Panel A” for the definition of openness as 
the ratio of sum of the import and export with GDP and “Panel B” for the definition 
of opent as the ratio of import with GDP.  
To be consistent with the theoretical expectations the estimated ß5is that are the 
coefficients of the openness terms is expected to be negative to indicate the declining 
effects of money on output with openness. On the other hand, according to Karras’s 
study   estimated α5is must be positive to indicate that prices increase by the 
increasing level of openness while it has to be negative to show a negative 
                                                 
1 http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html 
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relationship between inflation and level of openness to fit with the Romer’s 
expectations about the policy choice of money authority.   
Table1 shows that for both definitions of openness and for all of the three 
definitions of money, the estimated coefficients of sum of the interactive term of 
money with openness, which is shown as opent-1*mt-is are negative and statistically 
significant. And also, even if the signs of estimated coefficients of mt-is do change, 
the estimated coefficients of the sums of the mt-is are positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests that, change in the money supply declines the level of 
output.  
 Table2 shows that for both definitions of openness and for all of the three 
definitions of money, coefficients of the sums of the mt-is are positive and statistically 
significant. And the coefficients of sums of the interactive terms are negative. This 
means that inflation decreases by the increasing level of openness. We can offer two 
explanations for this. First as being parallel to the view of Romer’s, Turkish monetary 
authority injects money to system to maintain the current level of inflation (Turkey in 
her more than 25 years of high inflation did not experience hyper inflation) and 
injection of money just stimulate the output not inflation. Second, the openness 
measure increases due to higher imports. Higher imports, increases output and 
decreases prices due to substitution effect.    
 
      
                                                                                                                                           
2 M2Y= M2 + deposit in foreign currency denominated currency 
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 1.4 Conclusions 
In this paper it is shown that openness is an important factor for the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. Theoretically, using an open-economy model, openness can be 
shown to reduce the ability of the monetary policy to affect output, while adversely 
effecting inflation. Using quarterly data from 1987:1 up to 2001:1 period for Turkey, 
it is empirically shown that output level and prices have negative relationship with the 
level of openness. Turkey is in a trend to open its economy to foreign trade. This 
would be good for the increment of the investments and money circulation. But as a 
result of this empirical study, it can be said that the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy declines to manipulate the output so as well as the control of the economy.       
 In the light of the economic literature and experiences of Turkish economy, 
level of openness must be kept in view for the choice of monetary policy. Here we 
found out that, level of openness is negatively related to the average inflation rate. 
This means that Turkish money authority acts parallel to the predictions of Romer 
about the openness and monetary policy. But if money authority lets monetary 
expansion, it would cause Karras’s predictions to come true and increase inflation. It 
is right that Turkey never experienced hyperinflation but also could not decreased 
high inflation for decades. So, Turkish money authority must be very careful when it 
is deciding for monetary expansion in the open economy conditions.    
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Table 1.1     Output, Money and Openness (+) 
  PANEL A   PANEL B  
 
 
 (IM+EX)/GDP  IM/GDP  
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M2Y 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M2Y 
 
Constant 
 
-0.137** 
(-1.953) 
-0.076 
(-1.179) 
-0.182** 
(-3.145) 
-0.122* 
(-1.892) 
-0.084 
(-1.371) 
-0.174** 
(-3.095) 
D1 
 
-0.049 
(-0.570) 
-0.152* 
(-1.724) 
-0.038 
(-0.430) 
-0.042 
(-0.499) 
-0.108 
(-1.236) 
-0.007 
(-0.082) 
D2 
 
0.240* 
(1.811) 
0.130 
(1.076) 
0.311** 
(2.823) 
0.213* 
(1.726) 
0.138 
(1.198) 
0.295** 
(2.744) 
D3 
 
0.433** 
(4.0174) 
0.411** 
(4.569) 
0.492** 
(5.737) 
0.390** 
(3.956) 
0.379** 
(4.33) 
0.447** 
(5.273) 
D94 
 
-0.085** 
(-2.139) 
-0.105** 
(-3.158) 
-0.104** 
(-3.063) 
-0.099** 
(-2.431) 
-0.106 
(-2.976) 
-0.102** 
(-2.897) 
yt-1 
 
-0.265* 
(-1.652) 
-0.414** 
(-2.571) 
-0.230 
(-1.424) 
-0.258 
(-1.630) 
-0.350 
(-2.156) 
-0.186 
(-1.143) 
yt-2 
 
-0.145 
(-0.831) 
-0.141 
(-0.965) 
-0.047 
(-0.328) 
-0.191 
(-1.149) 
-0.196 
(-1.319) 
-0.108 
(-0.733) 
yt-3 
 
-0.092 
(-0.540) 
-0.111 
(-0.755) 
-0.199 
(-1.377) 
-0.116 
(-0.704) 
-0.141 
(-0.941) 
-0.213 
(-1.441) 
yt-4 
 
-0.109 
(-0.615) 
-0.112 
(-0.758) 
-0.183 
(-1.206) 
-0.053 
(-0.309) 
-0.047 
(-0.313) 
-0.116 
(-0.745) 
mt 
 
0.774** 
(2.19) 
1.018** 
(3.133) 
1.153** 
(2.925) 
0.668** 
(2.283) 
0.732** 
(2.683) 
0.935** 
(2.639) 
mt-1 
 
0.576* 
(1.666) 
0.513 
(1.508) 
0.053 
(0.127) 
0.494 
(1.6) 
0.258 
(0.89) 
-0.081 
(-0.22) 
mt-2 
 
0.274 
(0.711) 
-0.316 
(-0.934) 
-0.572 
(-1.360) 
0.439 
(1.327) 
-0.126 
(-0.432) 
-0.284 
(-0.725) 
mt-3 
 
-0.073 
(-0.214) 
0.373 
(1.096) 
0.455 
(1.091) 
0.039 
(0.126) 
0.378 
(1.233) 
0.389 
(0.994) 
mt-4 
 
0.618* 
(1.890) 
0.750** 
(2.061) 
0.849** 
(2.015) 
0.510* 
(1.833) 
0.577* 
(1.844) 
0.661* 
(1.66) 
opent-1*mt 
 
-1.267* 
(-1.835) 
-2.335** 
(-3.444) 
-2.259** 
(-2.735) 
-1.926* 
(-1.78) 
-3.304** 
(-2.1) 
-3.352** 
(-2.392) 
opent-1*mt-1 
 
-1.006 
(-1.579) 
-1.126 
(-1.579) 
-0.092 
(-0.112) 
-1.578 
(-1.469) 
-1.136 
(-0.978) 
0.213 
(0.155) 
opent-1*mt-2 
 
-0.428 
(-0.61) 
0.827 
(1.186) 
1.254 
(1.474) 
-1.356 
(-1.214) 
0.878 
(0.765) 
1.225 
(0.83) 
opent-1*mt-3 
 
0.332 
(0.513) 
-0.310 
(-0.439) 
-0.294 
(-0.348) 
0.328 
(0.302) 
-0.591 
(-0.486) 
-0.302 
(-0.203) 
opent-1*mt-4 
 
-1.327** 
(-2.122) 
-1.316* 
(-1.732) 
-1.619* 
(-1.896) 
-2.054** 
(-2.039) 
-1.888 
(-1.489) 
-2.363 
(-1.55) 
R2 0.985 0.988 0.987 0.984 0.986 0.986 
DW 2.051 2.245 2.163 2.154 2.312 2.197 
Σ4
i=0
 mt-i  
2.169 
(2.337) 
2.338 
(3.378) 
1.938 
(2.4) 
2.150 
(2.455) 
1.819 
(2.7) 
1.620 
(1.96) 
Opent-1* Σ4i=0 mt-i  
 
-3.697 
(-2.31) 
-4.259 
(-3.3) 
-3.011 
(-2.185) 
-6.587 
(-2.41) 
-6.041 
(-2.68) 
-4.580 
(-1.78) 
(+) The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis; * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%                                   
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Table 1.2      Prices, Money and Openness(+) 
  PANEL A   PANEL B  
 
 
 (IM+EX)/GDP  IM/GDP  
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M2Y 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M2Y 
 
Constant 
 
0.112** 
(3.245) 
0.048 
(1.362) 
0.059** 
(2.171) 
0.108** 
(2.922) 
0.049 
(1.362) 
0.062** 
(2.301) 
D1 
 
0.037** 
(2.123) 
0.054** 
(2.08) 
0.040** 
(2.123) 
0.038** 
(1.967) 
0.053** 
(1.99) 
0.036* 
(1.938) 
D2 
 
-0.007 
(-0.333) 
0.011 
(0.362) 
0.008 
(0.353) 
-0.003 
(-0.138) 
0.012 
(0.395) 
0.004 
(0.163) 
D3 
 
-0.054** 
(-2.733) 
-0.040 
(-1.38) 
-0.015 
(-0.634) 
-0.052** 
(-2.461) 
-0.036 
(-1.25) 
-0.017 
(-0.728) 
D94 
 
0.188** 
(5.713) 
0.203** 
(5.912) 
0.167** 
(5.854) 
0.182** 
(5.372) 
0.200** 
(5.795) 
0.169** 
(6.02) 
pt-1 
 
0.065 
(0.481) 
0.310* 
(1.895) 
0.444** 
(2.716) 
0.050 
(0.338) 
0.335** 
(2.049) 
0.480** 
(2.944) 
pt-2 
 
0.210 
(1.555) 
-0.101 
(-0.501) 
-0.287 
(-1.452) 
0.172 
(1.147) 
-0.155 
(-0.787) 
-0.308 
(-1.555) 
pt-3 
 
0.168 
(1.219) 
0.509 
(2.48) 
0.418** 
(2.233) 
0.152 
(1.061) 
0.491** 
(2.518) 
0.404** 
(2.152) 
pt-4 
 
-0.248* 
(-1.872) 
-0.143 
(-0.83) 
-0.044 
(-0.313) 
-0.171 
(-1.346) 
-0.107 
(-0.642) 
-0.048 
(-0.347) 
mt 
 
-0.121 
(-0.413) 
-0.703 
(-2.136) 
-1.230** 
(-3.804) 
-0.193 
(-0.732) 
-0.652** 
(-2.401) 
-1.232** 
(-4.231) 
mt-1 
 
0.267 
(0.909) 
0.073 
(0.242) 
0.891** 
(2.522) 
0.203 
(0.735) 
0.139 
(0.539) 
0.889** 
(2.774) 
mt-2 
 
0.826** 
(2.886) 
0.489 
(1.405) 
-0.221 
(-0.453) 
0.666** 
(2.427) 
0.329 
(1.123) 
-0.276 
(-0.603) 
mt-3 
 
0.229 
(0.808) 
0.165** 
(0.422) 
0.509 
(1.194) 
0.183 
(0.633) 
0.185 
(0.556) 
0.440 
(1.108) 
mt-4 
 
-0.262 
(-0.94) 
-0.242 
(-0.613) 
0.032 
(0.082) 
-0.092 
(-0.34) 
-0.163 
(-0.493) 
0.077 
(0.215) 
opent-1*mt 
 
-0.277 
(-0.505) 
0.679** 
(0.983) 
1.131* 
(1.769) 
-0.272 
(-0.294) 
1.029 
(0.968) 
2.153** 
(2.06) 
opent-1*mt-1 
 
-0.344 
(-0.637) 
0.426 
(0.724) 
-0.591 
(-1.05) 
-0.385 
(-0.404) 
0.681 
(0.714) 
-1.042 
(-1.129) 
opent-1*mt-2 
 
-1.658** 
(-3.234) 
-1.462** 
(-2.32) 
-0.482 
(-0.656) 
-2.530** 
(-2.798) 
-2.234** 
(-2.253) 
-0.735 
(-0.592) 
opent-1*mt-3 
 
-0.363 
(-0.681) 
0.046 
(0.065) 
-0.417 
(-0.60-5) 
-0.539 
(-0.528) 
0.001 
(0.0007) 
-0.486 
(-0.414) 
opent-1*mt-4 
 
0.235 
(0.445) 
0.296 
(0.372) 
-0.406 
(-0.562) 
-0.086 
(-0.089) 
0.318 
(0.245) 
-0.967 
(-0.785) 
R2 0.902 0.873 0.912 0.896 0.873 0.914 
DW 2.022 2.012 1.302 1.868 2.020 1.290 
Σ4
i=0
 mt-I 
0.940 
(1.09) 
-0.217 
(-0.28) 
-0.019 
1.31 
0.768 
(0.84) 
-0.162 
(-0.22) 
-0.101 
(-0.147) 
Opent-1* Σ4i=0 mt-I 
 
-2.406 
(-1.5) 
-0.014 
(-0.01) 
-0.766 
(-0.63) 
-3.810 
(-1.22) 
-0.206 
(-0.082) 
-1.077 
(0.5) 
(+) The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5 
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CHAPTER 2: The Asymmetric Effects of Government Spending 
Shocks: Empirical Evidence from Turkey 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Budget deficit and its sustainability have a prime importance in the 
establishment of economic policies in Turkey. Keynesian theory suggests that 
increased government spending stimulates aggregate demand and increases output. 
However, due to the increase in interest rates, government spending crowds out 
private consumption and private investment. Barro (1987) argues that, if the increase 
in the government spending is taken as permanent, then an increase in output will be 
realized without increasing interest rates. The purpose of this paper is to assess 
whether expansionary and contractionary government spending shocks have 
asymmetric effects on economic performance. The assessment of this asymmetric 
effect is important because it is often argued that decreasing prices and providing 
stability in the market will be followed by a decrease in government spending. There 
might be various reasons for this. First, if wages and prices are sticky downward, a 
contractionary government spending shock decreases output more than expansionary 
government spending shock increases it. Price response will tend more to an increase 
than a decrease in government spending. Second, when prices and wages are perfectly 
flexible and output is equal to near full employment level, then an increase in 
government spending does not increase output but a decrease in government spending 
decreases output. Third, interest rates increase in the face of expansionary 
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government spending shocks while there is no evidence of a reduction in the face of 
contractionary government spending shocks. The reason for this is that the response 
of private agents to an increase and a reduction in interest rates would be different; 
that is, the response of interest rates and private agents would be different to the 
expansionary and contractionary shocks (see, Kandil, 2001). Lastly, the economic 
outcome might be affected and changed by the perceptions and expectations of the 
public. If it is perceived to be permanent by the public, then the expansionary shock 
will increase aggregate demand, but if it is perceived to be temporary by the public, 
then the expansionary government spending shock will not effect aggregate demand 
very much. Thus, if the government the spending increase is perceived as permanent 
but the government the spending decrease is perceived as transitory, the effect of 
expansionary and contractionary fiscal policy on economic outcome will be 
asymmetric.    
Cover (1992) illustrates the asymmetric effects in the face of expansionary 
and contractionary economic policy shocks using the quarterly data of real output in 
the United States. He finds that contractionary economic policy shocks affect output 
while expansionary economic policy shocks do not affect output. Kandil (2001), 
using quarterly data for the United States, demonstrates the asymmetric effects of 
expansionary and contractionary shocks to government spending around an 
anticipated steady-state trend over time. She finds that while interest rates increase in 
the face of expansionary government spending shocks, there did not seem to be any 
evidence of a reduction in the face of contractionary shocks. Consequently, in the 
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face of an expansionary government spending shock, increased government spending 
crowds out private investment. Moreover, there is evidence of a reduction in private 
consumption. As a result, output growth and price inflation decrease despite 
expansionary government spending shocks, on average, over time.     
Studying the asymmetric effects of government spending shocks for the 
Turkish economy is interesting because Turkey has high persistent inflation without 
running into hyperinflation and this is a vital problem for the fiscal policies of the 
Turkish economy. Moreover, Turkish government spending is volatile, which can 
frequently create possible asymmetric effects. Thus, Turkey produces a laboratory 
environment to assess the effect of fiscal policy on economic performance. In the last 
two decades, the Turkish economy has performed unstable macro economic 
development. Growth during a period was followed by contraction in the next period. 
Every time that the government tried to compensate for the budget deficit, it affected 
the balance of the financial markets in the face of unstable interest rates. Therefore, 
explaining the asymmetric effects of Turkish government spending is an important 
macroeconomic topic to be worked on.  
In order to investigate unanticipated government spending shocks, we studied 
the effects of expansionary and contractionary government spending shocks on 
aggregate demand, prices, total private consumption and total private investment. 
Moreover, in order to carry out a more detailed investigation we also took into 
account the subcomponents of total private consumption and total private investment. 
We found that unanticipated government spending shocks have asymmetric effects on 
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the subcomponents of both total private consumption and total private investment. 
The empirical evidence reported here reveals that total private consumption and total 
private investment decrease in the face of expansionary government spending shocks; 
however, they do not change or decrease very little under contractionary government 
spending shocks. The analysis reveals that the private sector responds to the 
government spending shocks asymmetrically but there is no evidence as to the 
asymmetry in prices and output in the face of government spending shocks in Turkey. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodological 
framework. Section 3 gives the empirical evidence and interprets the estimates. 
Finally, section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
In order to investigate the possible asymmetric effects, we employ the following 
empirical model: 
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   (1) 
where gt is for percentage change of real government spending, zt is a vector of other 
economic variables of interest, and εgt and εzt are orthogonalized disturbances. 
In this model, the set of relevant explanatory variables (zt) includes logarithmic 
first difference of the real GDP, logarithmic first differences of the wholesale price 
index, logarithmic first differences of real total private consumption, logarithmic first 
differences of real total private investment, the logarithmic first difference of 
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government spending and the 3-month treasury bill rate. Furthermore, for a more 
specific investigation of the asymmetric effect of government spending shocks over 
consumption and investment; we have used some components of consumption and 
investment instead of total private consumption and total private investment 
themselves3. During the estimation process, if one of the components of total 
consumption was used instead of total private consumption itself, total private 
investment itself was used rather than its components and vice versa. When the 
estimation is performed, various dummy variables are also included. In order to 
account for seasonality, three dummy variables, which are denoted as Dit, are used for 
the seasonality effects over the quarterly data. D94t stands for the self-inflicted 1994 
crisis in the second quarter. Similarly, D00t stands for the crisis in the Turkish 
economy in the last quarter of 2000. The data for all the variables are gathered from 
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey electronic data delivery system4.  
In order to assess the positive and negative government spending shocks to fiscal 
policy, we define two variables, post and negt, which stand for the expansionary and 
contractionary government shocks, respectively. We measured the positive and 
negative government spending shocks in a similar way to Cover (1992) and Kandil 
(2001), as follows: 
post = 0.5 * (εgov t + ׀εgov t ׀)            (2)                                      
                                                 
3 Logarithmic first differences of durable goods, semi-durable goods, public sector consumption, 
public construction expenditures, private sector consumption, private sector machinery expenditures 
and private sector construction expenditures are taken as the components of total private consumption. 
Moreover, logarithmic first differences of mining and quarrying, manufacturing, total industrial and 
wholesale/ retail productions are taken as the components of total private investment.    
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      negt = -1 * (εgov t  - post)                 (3)  
Here, shock terms, which are denoted as εgov t , are the residual terms created by 
regressing the logarithmic first difference of government spending over the same 
explanatory variables of our model. post stands for the expansionary government 
spending shocks while negt stands for the contractionary government spending 
shocks. We include post and negt in the models to observe the asymmetric effects of 
unanticipated government spending shocks to assess their effect on aggregate 
demand, price level, total private consumption and total private investment. 
Therefore, we model the macroeconomic variable, which is claimed to be affected by 
government spending shocks asymmetrically. Then we include positive and negative 
shocks in the model as follows: 
ttttt NEGPOSXY η+Γ+Γ+Γ+Γ= 3210  
Where Yt is the variable under concern, Γ0 stands for the constant terms and dummy 
variables, Xt is the set of explanatory variables, Γ2 and Γ3 are the coefficients of the 
lagged effects of the positive and negative unanticipated government spending shocks 
on the concerned variables and ηt is the error term (see Appendix for details). 
Aggregate demand, prices, total private consumption and total private 
investment are expected to react to the fluctuations in government spending shocks. 
The estimates Γ2 and Γ3 will allow us to examine the asymmetry on the dependent 
                                                                                                                                           
4 http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html 
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variables created by the government expansionary and contractionary spending 
shocks.  
 If the expansionary and contractionary government spending shocks are 
perceived as permanent by the public, then the expansionary shock will increase 
aggregate demand, but if it is perceived as temporary by the public, then the 
expansionary government spending shock will affect the aggregate demand at a 
smaller magnitude. It is also possible that the government’s expansionary spending 
shock might be taken as permanent while the government contractionary spending 
shock is perceived as temporary. This suggests that the effect of unanticipated 
expansionary government spending would be greater than the effect of unanticipated 
contractionary government spending. Moreover, the way chosen by the government 
to finance the deficit would be important for the response of aggregate spending to 
expansionary and contractionary shocks. If the government borrows from the public 
to finance the gap which is induced by the expansionary spending shock, the public 
might see it as the increase of future wealth. This would trigger aggregate 
consumption and demand. But in order to capture the asymmetry, the level of the 
response of the aggregate demand to expansionary and contractionary shocks must 
not be balanced. In other words, an increase in the aggregate demand because of 
expansionary government shocks must be different from that of a decrease in the 
aggregate demand. It is expected that the expansionary effects of government 
spending shocks may exceed the contractionary effects on aggregate demand.  
 18 
 
 Consistent to the discussion about aggregate demand, private consumption 
would be determined with respect to the expectations of the public (expectations 
concerning the persistence of a shock), as well as the way of financing the spending 
shock by the government. It is expected that the expansionary effects of government 
spending will exceed the contractionary effects on private consumption.  
Kandil (2001) also suggests that interest rates increase in the face of an 
increase in government spending. This fact causes a decrease in private investment. In 
addition, a decrease in government spending would decrease interest rates and 
increase investment demand. The rates of increase and decrease in private investment 
in response to government spending shocks will not be equal. That is why we are 
looking for asymmetry.  
To sum up, the effect of unanticipated government shocks would be greater if 
they are accepted as permanent rather than temporary. The way chosen by the 
government to finance the deficit which is created by the government spending shock 
affects the amount of consumption and investment by the private sector. Likewise, 
interest rates, which will increase or decrease separately in the face of expansionary 
or contractionary government spending shocks, would affect private sector 
consumption and investment to create asymmetry.   
 
2.3 Empirical evidence 
The estimation process determines the asymmetric effect of government 
spending shocks on the dependent variables of our models. The models are estimated 
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with four lags. We used two methods for the estimation: least square (LS) and three 
stage least square (3SLS). First, we used LS to assess the asymmetric effect of fiscal 
policy on the economy. For the LS estimates, we used a two step procedure. In the 
first step, using Equations (1), (2) and (3), we constructed the post and negt terms to 
indicate the expansionary and contractionary government spending shocks. Then we 
regressed our four dependent variables (logarithmic first differences of aggregate 
demand -real GDP-, prices -WPI-, total private consumption and total private 
investment) over the explanatory variables. However, one may calculate post and negt 
incorporating the reduced form setting. Hence, 3SLS will be in order. In 3SLS, we 
used 6 lagged logarithmic first differences of all the dependent variables, as well as 
the explanatory variables themselves as instrumental variables in addition to the 
ordinary models.  
 Table 1 reports the estimations of the lag values for post and negt terms. Panel 
A shows the results of the LS estimation, while Panel B shows the results of the 3SLS 
process. In both of the panels, the first two columns present the sums of the 
coefficients of the post and negt terms (in order to account for their long tem effects), 
respectively. Column 3 for each panel presents the total effect generated by both 
expansionary and contractionary government spending shocks. Asymmetry in the 
effects of government spending shocks on unanticipated growth in the various 
explanatory variables of our model can be identified. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the p-
values of the Wald test statistics: column 4 reports the results of the hypothesis that 
the sum of the coefficients of post terms is equal to zero; column 5 tests the 
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hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of negt terms is equal to zero; the last 
column of each panel tests the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of the post 
terms is equal to the negative signed sum of the coefficients of negt terms. 
 Specifically, we concentrate on the sum of the coefficients for positive and 
negative government spending shocks on various explanatory variables. In Table 1 
and Panel A, by using LS for the estimation, the cumulative effect of expansionary 
government spending shocks on total private consumption is negative but statistically 
insignificant5. This suggests that total private consumption decreases as the amount of 
government spending increases. This fact can be related to the public’s opinion about 
the government’s policy of financing the spending shock. The public may decide that 
the gap created by the spending shock will be financed by the future taxes; total 
private consumption decreases. The cumulative effect of contractionary government 
spending shocks on total private consumption is negative and statistically 
insignificant. The difference between the cumulative effects of positive and negative 
spending shocks is the key factor for the identification of the asymmetry. For total 
private consumption, this difference is positive and statistically insignificant. But this 
result does not help us to capture  the asymmetric effect of a government 
spending shock. Furthermore, we find parallel results to the LS when we do the 
estimation by 3SLS to explain the effects of an unanticipated government spending 
shock on total private consumption. 
                                                 
5 The level of significance is 5% unless otherwise stated. 
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 Alternatively, we can use subcomponents of total private consumption, 
instead of using total private consumption itself. Keep in mind that, if one of the 
components of total private consumption was used instead of total private 
consumption itself, total private investment itself was used rather than its 
components. When we examined the subcomponents of total private consumption, we 
found more supporting evidence. Explaining unanticipated growth in durable goods 
consumption, the cumulative effects of positive and negative government spending 
shocks are negative. The results are statistically significant for positive government 
spending shocks, although insignificant for the negative ones. Parallel to the 
discussion about total private consumption, the asymmetric effect can be identified in 
the 3rd column. The difference between the cumulative effects of positive and 
negative shocks is negative and statistically significant. When we do the same 
examination for semi-durable goods consumption to see the effects of government 
spending shocks, we find that the test results for asymmetry are statistically 
insignificant, although the cumulative effect of contractionary government spending 
shocks is negative and statistically significant.  
Explaining the effects of unanticipated government spending shocks on 
private sector consumption as being another subcomponent of total private 
consumption, the cumulative effect of expansionary government spending shocks is 
negative and statistically significant. In the same way, the cumulative effect of 
contractionary government shocks is also negative and statistically significant. As the 
core point, the difference between the cumulative effects of expansionary and 
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contractionary shocks is negative and statistically significant, showing asymmetry. So 
we can say that observing the asymmetric effects of unanticipated government 
spending shocks, a contractionary spending shock decreases private sector 
consumption, and private sector consumption decreases even more under an 
expansionary spending shock. The results gathered from the 3SLS estimation are 
mostly parallel to the ones of LS, but empirical evidence is weaker.  
In Table 1, the cumulative effect of expansionary government shocks on 
prices (WPI) is negative, although statistically insignificant. We can say that the 
reduction in private spending, along with the increase in the government spending, 
decreases prices over time. The cumulative effect of contractionary government 
spending is also negative and statistically insignificant. Finally, the difference 
between the cumulative effects of expansionary and contractionary government 
shocks is negative and statistically insignificant. Thus, once more, we could not 
capture the asymmetric effect at a meaningful significancy level. With the 3SLS 
estimation method, the cumulative effect of expansionary government spending shock 
on prices is positive, although insignificant. This can be explained by the positive 
effect of government spending shock on aggregate demand in the 3SLS method. 
Increasing demand increases prices. The cumulative effect of contractionary 
government spending shocks is negative and insignificant. Finally, in the 3SLS 
method, to determine the asymmetry, we examine the 3rd column; the difference 
between the cumulative effects of expansionary and contractionary government 
spending shocks is positive, although statistically insignificant. 
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 Although economic theory suggests an indirect relationship between 
unanticipated government shocks and total private investment, our empirical study 
indicates the opposite situation with high p-values for both LS and 3SLS and also for 
some of the subcomponents of total private investment.                                                                                
For aggregate demand, if we examine the effect of an unanticipated 
government spending shock on the real GDP, in Panel A, by intersecting the last row 
and the first column, we see that the cumulative effect of expansionary government 
spending shocks is negative, although statistically insignificant. The cumulative effect 
of contractionary government spending shocks on aggregate demand is negative and 
statistically significant. Asymmetry in aggregate demand shifts is captured by the 
difference between the expansionary and contractionary government shocks, which is 
positive and significant. When we do the estimation with 3SLS, we see that the 
cumulative effect of expansionary government spending shocks is positive, although 
statistically insignificant. The cumulative effect of contractionary government 
spending shocks on aggregate demand is positive and statistically significant. Finally, 
in the 3SLS method, to determine the asymmetry, we examine the 3rd column; the 
difference between the cumulative effects of expansionary and contractionary 
government spending shocks is negative and statistically significant. That is, demand 
contraction is evident in the face of expansionary and contractionary government 
spending shocks.                                                                               
It can be seen in Table 1 that using total government spending does not 
support what the economic theory suggests. When we used the total government 
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spending variable to capture the unanticipated government spending shocks on 
various explanatory variables, we could not reach statistically significant results 
except for real GDP, durable goods and semi-durable goods when investigated with 
LS and 3SLS and for private sector consumption when investigated with LS only. 
Since the results were insignificant when we used total government spending during 
the estimation process of government spending, we used the difference between the 
treasury auction interest rate and the previous quarter’s interbank interest rate (so 
called auction in our work) alternatively to the total government spending variable. 
The reason for using treasury auction interest rates rather than the government 
spending variable should be explained. Total government spending includes figures 
from the consolidated budget; and in the very relaxed supervision of this consolidated 
budget system of Turkey, some public institutions (particularly local administrations) 
invoice their own spending to the government. Conversely, sometimes governments 
show their expenditures as if they were the expenditures of public institutions and 
avoid reporting these expenditures in the government budget6. Such budgetary 
movements are called hidden liabilities (Esfahani and Kim, 2002). This problem is 
not peculiar to Turkish economy. Most governments have financial commitments and 
contingent liabilities that do not receive explicit budgetary operations or even official 
recognition. Less transparent fiscal systems tend to produce more liabilities. 
Conditioning the fiscal transparency to attain fiscal discipline is also emphasized in 
various international pacts and multilateral arrangements as in the European Union’s 
                                                 
6 See Atiyas, Gunduz, Emil, Erdem and Ozgun (1999). 
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Maastricht Treaty and the IMF conditionality. In fact, since Turkey is a candidate 
country for entry to the European Union and has close relations with IMF, one of the 
main planning reforms of the ongoing economic program of the Turkish economy 
concerns the restructuring of public fiscal management and fiscal transparency.7 
Thus, some non-government spending is included in the total government spending in 
the budget and independent of the unanticipated government spending shocks. 
However, the borrowing cost of the government, treasury auction interest rates, 
reflects the true value of government spending, which is done purely by the treasury. 
Berument (2002) suggests using the spread between the treasury auction interest rate 
and the lagged value of the interbank interest rate to account for fiscal policy.                                            
In Table 2, we can see the effects of unanticipated expansionary government 
shocks when we take treasury auction interest rates as government spending. This 
time the shock term, εgov, is generated by regressing treasury auction interest rates on 
the various explanatory variables. Table 2 is constructed the same as Table 1.  
In Panel A of Table 2, by using LS for the estimation, the cumulative effect of 
expansionary government spending shocks on total private consumption is positive 
and statistically significant. This means that an increase in government spending 
increases total private consumption. The increase in total private consumption in the 
face of an expansionary government shock can be explained in such a way that the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect. On the other hand, the cumulative 
                                                 
7 See the report drawn up by Special Ad Hoc Committee on Restructuring of Public Fiscal 
Management and Fiscal Transparency, March 2000, 
http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/kamumali/oik8/pubfinan.doc.  
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effect of contractionary government spending shocks on total private consumption is 
positive but statistically insignificant.  The difference between the cumulative effects 
of positive and negative shocks is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, we 
can capture the asymmetry in the effects of unanticipated expansionary and 
contractionary government shocks on total private consumption. Moreover, when we 
do the estimation with 3SLS, we find results similar to those reported in Panel B of 
Table 2 with higher levels of significance.  
When we examined the lower components of total private consumption to see 
if they are affected by unanticipated expansionary and contractionary government 
shocks, measured with treasury auction interest rates, we found more evidence to 
support asymmetric effects. Explaining unanticipated growth in durable goods 
consumption, after the 3SLS estimation (presented in Panel B of Table 2), the 
cumulative effect of expansionary government shocks is positive and statistically 
significant. This means that the consumption of durable goods increases in the face of 
an increase in government spending. On the other hand, the cumulative effect of 
contractionary government shocks on durable goods consumption is positive but 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The difference between the cumulative 
effects of positive and negative shocks is positive and statistically significant, which 
indicates asymmetry. 
Explaining the unanticipated expansionary and contractionary government 
shocks measured with treasury auction interest rates on private sector consumption as 
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being another lower component of total private consumption like we did before, in 
Panel A, the cumulative effect of expansionary government shocks is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The cumulative effect of contractionary 
government shocks is also positive and statistically significant. The difference 
between the cumulative effects of expansionary and contractionary shocks is positive 
and statistically significant, thus indicating asymmetry. As a result, by observing the 
asymmetric effects of unanticipated government shocks, we can argue that private 
sector consumption increases with both expansionary and contractionary shocks. The 
3SLS estimation method also indicates an asymmetric effect of government spending 
on private sector consumption. The results that are reported in Panel B of Table 2 are 
statistically significant and this time results are statistically significant also for the 
contractionary government spending shocks.   
  When we investigated the asymmetric effects of expansionary and 
contractionary government shocks on machinery consumption, we found supporting 
evidence with 3SLS. As reported in Panel B of Table 2, machinery consumption is 
decreased by the effect of expansionary government shock. This result is statistically 
significant. It can be seen in the same panel that contractionary government shocks 
decrease the machinery spending more than expansionary shocks do, and this is 
statistically significant. The difference between the cumulative effects of 
expansionary and contractionary shocks is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating asymmetry. 
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Identifying the effects of government shocks on private construction 
consumption with LS estimation, we find results similar to those for private sector 
consumption. The cumulative effect of expansionary government shocks is positive 
and statistically significant 5.7% level. The cumulative effect of contractionary 
government shocks is also positive and statistically significant. The difference 
between the cumulative effects of expansionary and contractionary shocks is positive 
and statistically significant, showing asymmetry. Thus, observing the asymmetric 
effects of unanticipated government shocks, we can say that private construction 
consumption increases for both expansionary and contractionary shocks.  When we 
do the estimation with 3SLS, the expansionary and contractionary government shocks 
and the difference between the cumulative effects of expansionary and contractionary 
shocks is positive and statistically significant, indicating asymmetry. 
The estimates from total private investment do not reflect asymmetric effects 
in the face of unanticipated government shocks. However, if we use the lower 
components of total private investment instead of itself, we find supporting evidence 
with 3SLS estimation. The effect of expansionary government shocks on 
manufacturing is negative and statistically significant. In other words, manufacturing 
investment decreases in the face of expansionary government shocks. Contractionary 
government shocks also affect manufacturing negatively and the results are 
statistically significant. As the core point, the difference between the cumulative 
effects of expansionary and contractionary shocks is negative and statistically 
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significant, showing asymmetry. We reach the same results with total industrial and 
wholesale/retail investments. 
 Compared with the results of the asymmetric effects of government spending 
shocks in Table 1, we find more supporting results in Table 2. In fact, this supports 
our hypothesis that treasury auction interest rates are more suitable for representing 
government spending. As reported in Table 2, using treasury auction interest rates, 
there is evidence that unanticipated government spending has asymmetric effects on 
total private consumption and on the lower components of total private consumption 
and total private investment. Although supported weakly with LS estimation, with 
3SLS there is greater supporting evidence for our hypothesis. In Panel B of Table 2, 
the results for total private consumption, durable goods consumption, private sector 
consumption, machinery consumption, and private construction consumption are 
statistically significant. In addition, the results for the subcomponents of total private 
investment, specifically for manufacturing, total industrial production and 
wholesale/retail production are statistically significant, capturing the asymmetric 
effects of expansionary and contractionary government spending shocks.  
 
2.4 Summary and conclusions: 
 Government spending and its effects is an imported topic to be worked on, 
especially for the countries, like Turkey, which have chronic budget deficits. There 
has been considerable discussion and many studies regarding government spending in 
Turkey. Government spending has some direct and indirect impacts on the various 
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macroeconomic variables. An increase in government spending would cause 
aggregate demand to increase. Correspondingly, increasing demand stimulates output 
growth and price inflation, so this situation affects private consumption and 
investment although we do not observe that the decrease in government spending 
affects the economy. 
  However, the relationship between government spending and the variables 
affected by the government spending is asymmetric, such that the effect of an 
increase in government spending may be different from that of a decrease in 
government spending. One reason for the asymmetry is the capacity constraints in the 
credit market. A positive shock to government spending above an anticipated steady-
state trend increases the demand for loanable funds and raises the interest rate. The 
increasing interest rate crowds out the expansionary government spending shocks. 
However, the interest rate does not decrease in the face of contractionary government 
spending shocks. Of course, private investment does not increase in the face of 
contractionary government spending shocks.  
 Another source of asymmetry may the response of private consumption to 
government spending shocks. The perception of the government spending shock by 
private agents is important in clarifying the effect of government spending shocks. 
Specifically, agents decrease consumption in anticipation of future tax liability in the 
face of expansionary government spending shocks.  
In this paper, it is shown that asymmetry in the effects of government 
spending shocks can be best captured when treasury auction interest rates were used 
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to indicate the government’s fiscal stance. Moreover, when we used subcomponents 
of private consumption and private investment, the results of estimation results 
became more supportive.  
 The effects of expansionary government spending are closely related to the 
economy’s ongoing state. Asymmetry in the face of government spending shocks 
indicates that the stabilizing effects of fiscal policies are dependent on the state of the 
business cycle. During recessions, the expansionary effects of an increase in 
government spending are likely to be pronounced, speeding up recovery towards full-
equilibrium. In contrast, a decline in government spending during boom periods is 
likely to stimulate a fast increase in private spending, hindering the success of 
contractionary fiscal policy in moderating excess demand.         
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Appendix:  
The particular model we estimated in this paper is:  
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∆lnYt: Logarithmic first difference of real GDP. 
∆lnPt: Logarithmic first difference of wholesale price index. 
∆lnCt: Logarithmic first difference of real total private consumption. 
∆lnIt: Logarithmic first difference of real total private investment. 
∆lnGt: Logarithmic first difference of government spending. 
Rt: 3-month treasury bill rate 
Dit: Dummy variable for seasonal effects. 
D94t: Dummy variable for 1994 crisis occurred in the second quarter. 
D00t: Dummy variable for 2000 crisis occurred in the fourth quarter. 
post: Positive government shocks. 
negt: Negative government shocks. 
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TABLE 2.1: The Asymmetric Effects of Government Spending Innovations 
 
                                  Panel A: Least Square Estimates            Panel B: 3 Stage Least Square Estimates                  
The sum of 
the 
coefficients 
of the post 
terms, with 
lag values 
1 to 4 
The sum of 
the 
coefficients of 
the negt 
terms, with 
lag values 1 
to 4 
 
 
 
 
The 
diffrence 
of sums 
 
 
 
Wald 
test of 
post 
terms 
 
 
 
Wald 
test of 
negt 
terms 
 
 
 
 
Wald test 
of the 
model 
The sum of 
the 
coefficients 
of the post 
terms, with 
lag values 1 
to 4 
The sum of 
the 
coefficients 
of the negt 
terms, with 
lag values 
1 to 4 
 
 
 
 
The 
diffrence 
of sums 
 
 
 
Wald 
test of 
post 
terms 
 
 
 
 
Wald test 
of negt 
terms 
 
 
 
 
Wald test 
of the 
model 
TOTAL PRIVATE 
CONSUMPTION -14.621 -50.400 35.779 0.607 0.128 0.187 -26.312 -38.043 11.732 0.511 0.219 0.323 
    Durable goods -307.427(**) -188.340 -119.087(**) 0.019 0.169 0.043 -380.705 -513.131(*) 132.426(*) 0.152 0.088 0.088 
    Semi-durable goods -16.703 -265.791(*) 249.088 0.911 0.085 0.224 369.039(**) -214.803 583.842 0.041 0.208 0.570 
    Public sector -73.082 -170.846 97.764 0.704 0.379 0.428 -229.628 -19.623 -210.005 0.217 0.934 0.490 
    Public construction -174.862 -106.831 -68.031 0.229 0.677 0.386 -381.975 35.392 -417.368 0.279 0.946 0.468 
    Private sector -385.454(**) -203.043(*) -182.410(**) 0.020 0.071 0.011 -168.345 79.596 -247.941 0.631 0.853 0.895 
    Machinery -414.978 -25.325 -389.653 0.112 0.895 0.122 -2102.093 734.167 -2836.260 0.440 0.559 0.475 
    Private construction 23.845 27.349 -3.504 0.567 0.650 0.553 23.622 46.755 -23.133 0.586 0.696 0.655 
 
TOTAL PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT 266.238 -81.194 347.432 0.117 0.682 0.530 444.726(*) -150.606 595.333 0.063 0.416 0.450 
   Mining and quarrying 16.408 55.239 -38.831 0.827 0.533 0.604 -27.861 -139.665 111.804 0.864 0.748 0.764 
   Manufacturing -30.969 -34.204 3.235 0.379 0.435 0.367 1.107 34.947 -33.840 0.967 0.327 0.531 
   Industrial total -40.718 -18.616 -22.101 0.420 0.754 0.545 -61.596 221.498 -283.094 0.914 0.615 0.845 
   Construction industry 30.734 -19.387 50.120 0.434 0.695 0.880 69.505 38.520 30.985 0.359 0.655 0.473 
   Wholesale, retail 2.915 72.605 -69.690 0.939 0.491 0.561 10.647 136.183 -125.536 0.847 0.354 0.454 
WPI -53.165 -47.191 -5.974 0.148 0.270 0.115 4.006 -13.270 17.276 0.943 0.759 0.919 
Real GDP -33.202 -57.849(*) 24.646(**) 0.193 0.052 0.039 3.295 38.834(**) -35.539(*) 0.140 0.030 0.052 
 
      *   Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Note: The first column of both of the panels is multiplied by 100 for simplicity. 
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TABLE 2.2: The Asymmetric Effects of Treasury Interest Rate Innovations  
 
                           
                            Panel A: Least Square Estimates            Panel B: 3 Stage Least Square Estimates 
The sum of 
the 
coefficients 
of the post 
terms, with 
lag values 
1 to 4 
The sum of 
the 
coefficients 
of the negt 
terms, with 
lag values 
1 to 4 
 
 
 
 
The 
difference 
of sums 
 
 
 
Wald 
test of 
post 
terms 
 
 
 
Wald 
test of 
negt 
terms 
 
 
 
 
Wald test 
of the 
model 
The sum of 
the 
coefficients 
of the post 
terms, with 
lag values 1 
to 4 
The sum of 
the 
coefficients 
of the negt 
terms, with 
lag values 
1 to 4 
 
 
 
 
The 
difference 
of sums 
 
 
 
Wald 
test of 
post 
terms 
 
 
 
 
Wald test 
of negt 
terms 
 
 
 
 
Wald test of 
the model 
TOTAL PRIVATE 
CONSUMPTION 5.446(**) 3.180 2.266(**) 0.028 0.101 0.047 4.281(**) 1.708(*) 2.574(**) 0.000 0.088 0.003 
    Durable goods 3.957 2.666 1.292 0.307 0.239 0.162 7.367(**) 2.010(*) 5.357(**) 0.001 0.084 0.000 
    Semi-durable goods 2.038 1.022 1.016 0.934 0.913 0.927 6.950 2.509 4.441 0.167 0.223 0.176 
    Public sector -2.483 -1.170 -1.313 0.732 0.853 0.706 -10.598(*) 12.797(*) -23.396 0.074 0.090 0.744 
    Public construction -2.177 -0.046 -2.131 0.876 0.996 0.901 -1.246 8.516(*) -9.762 0.786 0.052 0.287 
    Private sector 8.853(*) 6.821(**) 2.032(**) 0.069 0.032 0.043 8.685(**) 7.163(**) 1.523(**) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Machinery -8.262 -9.995 1.733 0.629 0.610 0.615 -14.226(**) -16.348(**) 2.122(**) 0.021 0.018 0.019 
    Private construction 4.193(*) 3.122(**) 1.071(**) 0.057 0.009 0.021 6.186(**) 3.727(**) 2.460(**) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
TOTAL PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT -40.053 -37.204 -2.849 0.199 0.127 0.158 -17.654 -8.875 -8.779 0.316 0.586 0.426 
   Mining and quarrying -4.174 -2.442 -1.732 0.410 0.604 0.413 -5.620(*) -1.748 -3.871(**) 0.078 0.372 0.009 
   Manufacturing -2.387 -0.036 -2.351 0.185 0.984 0.442 -3.585(**) -2.371(**) -1.214(**) 0.000 0.026 0.001 
   Industrial total 0.235 -0.090 0.325 0.325 0.386 0.597 -1.035(**) -0.018(**) -1.018(**) 0.000 0.015 0.023 
   Construction industry -0.085 0.720 -0.805 0.976 0.645 0.871 0.770 0.798(*) -0.028 0.389 0.092 0.196 
   Wholesale, retail -1.889 0.701 -2.590 0.325 0.386 0.597 -2.139(**) 0.592(**) -2.730(**) 0.000 0.015 0.023 
 
WPI -0.939 -0.538 -0.401 0.823 0.869 0.841 0.416 1.175 -0.760 0.790 0.416 0.590 
Real GDP 1.262 0.659 0.604 0.606 0.731 0.654 0.627 -0.144 0.772 0.464 0.856 0.766 
*   Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Note: The first column of both of the panels is multiplied by 100 for simplicity. 
